




Volume 12 No. 3  
May 2012 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CREDIT CONSTRAINTS ON FARM 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC WELFARE IN THE HINTERLAND OF 
KINSHASA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 




























*Corresponding author email: henri_muayila@yahoo.fr 
 
1Centre for Agricultural and Food Economics, Faculty of Bioscience Engineering, 










This study investigates the impact of credit constraints on farm household economic 
welfare. Data were cross sectional and collected at household level in the Hinterland 
of Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo. The sample survey consists of 202 farm 
households randomly selected. The survey was conducted from February to March 
2008. The non-parametric method known as the Propensity Score Matching was 
applied to compute the impact of credit constraints on farm household welfare. The 
credit constraints were identified based on direct questions to households about their 
credit status. The household economic welfare was measured using the consumption 
approach. The results from descriptive statistics establish the existence of high level 
of credit constraints among farm households in the area of study. The majority of 
farm households (71%) have to endure credit constraints. The results of descriptive 
statistics indicate that the lack of collateral, the loan terms conditions, the credit 
technology, the higher level of agricultural risks, the high interest rates and the low 
returns on farming activities explain the limited access to credit by farmers. The 
results of logit model show that household social capital, household access to 
remittances, household land holding and household access to extension service tend 
to reduce the probability of being credit constrained, while the household size tends 
to increase the propensity of being credit constrained. The results of the  propensity 
score matching report that credit constraints reduce per capita food consumption per 
day from -197 FC to -219 FC (-0.35$ to -0.39$). The impact of credit constraints on 
per capita non-food consumption per day is quite difficult to be supported. The 
results report that only ATT obtained from Radius estimator shows a negative and 
significant effect at p<0.010. The average effect of credit constraints on per capita 
total consumption per day is estimated at about -328 FC (-0.59$) under Radius 
matching, -269FC (-0.48 $) under Kernel matching and -280 FC (-0.50$) under 
Stratification matching. The average impact on the ratio of per capita total 
consumption per day to poverty line of 1$ and to poverty line of 2$ ranges from -0.59 
to 0, 48 and from -0.29 to -0.23, respectively. The study concludes that the 
improvement of farm household access to credit could result in increasing economic 
welfare.  
 









Despite its large and various natural resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty in DRC has become 
a phenomenon of mass. However, the incidence, the depth and the severity of poverty 
are higher in the rural areas rather than in the urban areas [1, 2, 3, 4]. The credit 
constraints as a result of the market imperfections have been recognized as one of 
main constraints to the improvement of farm household welfare in the periphery of 
Kinshasa [1,2]. The literature argues that a more efficient provision of financial 
services is welfare improving because of several reasons: the access to credit may 
affect household decisions and welfare distribution through the consumption 
smoothing, the income enhancement and smoothing, the risk-coping effect, the 
liquidity effect and the income and wealth effect [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. This construction has 
been supported by many previous empirical studies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. This 
paper is an assessment of credit constraints’ impact on the economic welfare of 
households in the Hinterland of Kinshasa. Thus, two questions are addressed: What 
are the main determinants of household credit constraints? How much and in which 
direction do credit constraints affect the economic welfare of credit constrained 
households?  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The study was conducted in the Hinterland of Kinshasa, which consists of all the 
neighborhoods of the green belt of Kinshasa. Given the lack of reliable data, the first 
step of the survey consists of carrying out the accounting of the households per 
village.  The sample is made by a quota with a rate of 15% per village. The survey 
related household survey was conducted in villages located in the area between 
Menkao, Dumi and Mbankana, where Téké represent the main share of the 
population. Three groups of villages have been selected for the survey. The first group 
includes Menkao, Bita and Kingankadi. The second consists of Dumi, Mutiene and 
Isolo. The last one comprises Mbankana, Cité-CADIM and Kinzono. To simplify the 
analysis and given the small size of the sample, these groups are named, respectively 
Menkao group, Dumi group and Mbankana group. The sample consists of 202 
households randomly selected from each village. A structured questionnaire is used to 
obtain data. It consists of questions regarding household characteristics, including the 
age, the gender and the education of the head of household, the off-farm activities, the 
social capital as well as the household consumption. The survey was conducted from 
February to March 2008. The credit constraints were identified based on direct 
questions to households about their credit status.  
 
Assessing the impact of credit constraints on the economic welfare of constrained 
households requires the comparison of the observed outcome of constrained 
households (welfare indicators) with the outcome that would have resulted if they 
were not constrained. However, only one outcome is observed. This is known in the 
literature on the impact evaluation as counterfactual problem [17, 18].  If the credit 
constraints were random, one could compute their effects by comparing the average 
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only possible and reliable in natural experimental observations. Furthermore, because 
household credit status is not random, the simple comparison of the average outcome 
of both groups is not appropriate and could lead to an over estimation of the impact. 
Therefore, given the non experimental nature of the data set used in this study and the 
counterfactual problem (missing data), the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is 
applied to estimate the impact of credit constraints on the welfare distribution of the 
constrained households. By applying PSM, it is assumed that being credit constrained 
could be similar to a “treatment”. Thus, the Average Treatment Effect on Treated 
(ATT) may be estimated as a proxy of impact of credit constraints on constrained 
households.  
 
Following Becker and Ichino [17], the propensity score of being credit constrained
)(zP  is defined as a conditional probability given a set of observable characteristics 
of households )(z . Furthermore, it is assumed that the probability of being credit 
constrained ranges between 0 and 1, which means that ( ( ) 10  zP ); and may be 
obtained by computing )/()/1Pr()( zCEzCzP i === . It is also assumed that if the 
exposure to credit constraints is random within cells defined by )( iz , it is also random 
within cells defined by )(zP . The propensity score may be estimated using either logit 
model or probit model. After the estimation of propensity score of being credit 
constrained, the next step is then to compute the Average Treatment Effect on Treated 
(ATT) or the average impact of credit constraints on the economic welfare of 
constrained households. Then, ATT may be computed by calculating the following 
equation:  
 
 [ ]1/01 =−= iii CWWEATT  
  [ ]))(,1/( 01 zPCWWEE iii =−=  
  { } { }{ }0/)(,0/)(,1/ 01 ==−== iiiii CzPCWEzPCWEE  
Where iW1 and iW0 are sets of household welfare indicators for constrained households 
(treatment group) and unconstrained households (control group), respectively. For 
empirical estimation, household economic welfare is measured by the per capita 
household total consumption per day (TCONSDP), the per capita household food 
consumption per day (FOODPD), the per capita household non food consumption per 
day (NFOODPD), the ratio TCONSDP to poverty line (1$) and the ratio TCONSDP 
to poverty line (2$). The treatment variable C  defines household credit status, which 
is a binary choice taking value 1 if a given household faces credit constraints and 0 
otherwise. Z  is a set of conditional variables or observable household characteristics 
assumed to be potentially associated with credit status. Different household socio-
economic characteristics are selected, including the household size (HHSIZE), 
dependency ratio (DRATIO), the age of household head (HHAG), the household head 
education (EDUCHH), the gender of household head (HHMAL), the household 
participation into off-farm activities (OFFFARM), the access to the extension services 
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household land holding property (LANDPROPERTY), the household size (HHSIZE), 
household participation into social and economic organizations (ASSOCIATION) and 
household location (MBANKANA, DUMI and MENKAO).  
 
As the propensity score is a continuous variable, it becomes fairly hard to expect a lot 
of observations within the same region, thus, the exact matching is not possible. 
Furthermore, the estimated ATT may be sensitive to the choice of matching 
techniques or different neighborhoods. To avoid this problem and following Becker 
and Ichino [17], different matching techniques are implemented, such as Nearest 
Neighbor matching, Radius matching, Kernel matching and Stratification matching.  
In the Nearest Neighbor matching, each unit of credit constrained group is matched to 
an unconstrained unit using the closest propensity score. While in the Radius 
matching, constrained households are only matched with unconstrained households 
within a range of propensity scores. Within Kernel matching, the propensity score of 
each constrained unit is matched with the Kernel weighted average outcome of all 
unconstrained units. Finally, with Stratification matching, the range of variation of the 
propensity score is divided into intervals such that within each interval constrained 
and unconstrained households have on average the same propensity score. 
 
The p score computer program, developed by Becker and Ichino [17] and prepared as 
a Stata software application was applied for empirical estimation of ATT. The first 
step is the estimation of propensity score of being credit constrained using logit 
model.  The dependant variable is household credit status, which is assumed to be 
equal to 1 if household faces credit constraints and 0 otherwise. The explanatory 
variables are household characteristics and village of residence. After the estimation 
of propensity score, the next step is to compute the Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (ATT). However, before generating ATT, it was ensured that the sample is 
comparable and the estimation is restricted to the observations within the region of 
common support, which is the area where there are sufficient observations of both 
groups. Households without comparable values in the other group are excluded before 




The results of the survey indicate that 38 % of households did not apply for a loan 
because of several reasons and thus are considered as being credit constrained. The 
lack of collateral (79%), inappropriate terms /conditions of loans provided by local 
financial organizations (83%), small amount of credit provided by local lenders which 
is inappropriate to the need of agriculture (76%), high risks related to the agricultural 
activities (71%), high interest rate applied by lenders (71%) and low returns on 
farming activities (78%) are the main reasons mentioned by farmers to explain why 
they did not apply for a loan.  In addition, 3% of households did not apply for credit 
because they did not need credit and, therefore, were classified as credit 
unconstrained. About 59 % of households from the sample applied for credit, 26% 
received the total amount of the loan requested, 22% did not receive the total amount 
applied, and 11% did not receive anything. Thus, 71% of households from the sample 
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Tables 1 and 2 report the distribution of household socio-economic characteristics 
with respect to status  credit constraints. The results show that household participation 
in off-farm activities, household participation in social and economic associations, 
regular access to remittances, household holding property, household access to 
extension services and household size are associated with credit status. Table 3 
reports the descriptive distribution of a set of household welfare indicators obtained 
from the survey. The results from table 3 show an important gap in welfare 
distribution between constrained and unconstrained households. The average 
difference is about 428 FC for the per capita total household consumption per day, 
196 FC for the per capita non-food consumption per day, 232 FC for the per capita 
food consumption, 0.764 for the ratio of the per capita total consumption per day to 
poverty line (1$) and 0.382 for the ratio of per capita total consumption per day to 
poverty line (2$). The difference in means of welfare distribution between 
unconstrained and constrained households is significant at p>0.000 for all selected 
indicators.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of logit model used to estimate propensity scores of being 
credit constrained, while table 5 presents the distribution of these propensity scores. 
The results from table 4 show that the existence of off-farm activities within 
households,  household participation  in social and economic organizations, the 
regular access to remittances,  land  holding,  access to  extension services affect 
negatively the probability of facing credit constraints. The size of household is 
positively associated with the propensity of being credit constrained. However, credit 
constraints are not significantly associated with the dependence ratio, the formal 
education of household head, the age of household head, the gender of household 
head and the village of residence.  
 
Once the propensity score of being credit constrained was estimated for each 
household from the sample, the balancing condition was checked and found satisfied. 
Before generating the average impact of credit constraints on the welfare of 
constrained households or ATT, the common support region was computed.  Table 6 
presents the impact of credit constraints on the welfare of constrained households. 
In light of the results of table 6, one notes that on the average, credit constraints 
conditions have a reducing effect on per capita food consumption per day, ranging 
from -197 FC(-0.35$) to -219 FC (-0.39$). Under minimalist hypothesis, the average 
impact of credit constraints on per capita food consumption per year could be 
estimated at about -130$. The effect on food consumption is significant for all 
matching estimators, but with different thresholds of significance. The ATT garnered 
is significant at about p<0.010 for Nearest Neighbor matching; p<0.005 for Kernel 
and Stratification matching; and p<0.001 for Radius matching. The Radius matching 
estimator provides the maximum value of ATT, whereas the Nearest Neighbor 
furnishes the minimum value of ATT.  
 
Using food consumption as an outcome variable, the impact of credit constraints on 
per capita non-food consumption per day is quite difficult to be supported. The result 
reports that only ATT obtained from Radius estimator show negative and significant 
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ATT obtained from Kernel, Nearest Neighbor and Stratification estimators despite 
being affected by a negative sign are not significant.   
 
Considering total consumption as an interest variable, the results reported in table 6 
show that credit constraints reduce per capita total consumption by about 328 FC 
(0.59$) per day under Radius method, 269FC (0.48 $) under Kernel method and 280 
FC (0.50$) under Stratification method. The ATT is significant at about p<0.001 
under Radius and Stratification matching, whereas it is significant at p<0.005 under 
Kernel. Thus, it ensures that the average effect of credit constraints on per capita total 
consumption for constrained households can be valued close to – 215$ per year. 
However, although the ATT obtained from Nearest Neighbors matching shows a 
negative effect estimated at about -260 FC, it remains statistically insignificant.  
 
The results from table 6 report also that ATT obtained using the ratio of per capita 
total consumption per day to poverty line (1$) and that of poverty line (2$) as 
outcome variables are both negative.  The average effect of credit constraints ranges 
from -0.59 to -0, 48 for the first and from -0.29 to -0.23 for the second. ATT obtained 
from the ratio of per capita total consumption per day to 1$ of poverty line is 
significant at p<0.000 under Radius and Stratification matching, p<0.005 under 
Kernel matching and not significant under Nearest Neighbor matching. ATT obtained 
from the ratio of per capita total consumption to poverty line (2$) is significant at 
p<0.000 under Radius, p<0.005 under Kernel and Stratification matching and not 




The provision of financial services to poor farmers in DRC, as is the case in a lot of 
developing nations, has often been perceived as difficult. The main difficulties in the 
financing of agriculture are related to the information problem, the high transaction 
costs, the low returns of agriculture and the high covariant risk. Maldonado [6] and 
González-Vega [5] reported that “several difficulties create existence problems (no 
access), increase the costs of access, and add to other market failures. Those 
difficulties are related to “(i) high transaction costs for both borrowers and lenders, 
which increase the cost of the loans beyond interest rates and depend on distance 
(physical, cultural, and social), (ii) information problems, which create uncertainty 
for the lender about the ability and willingness to repay of the borrower and may thus 
result in adverse selection and moral hazard, (iii) incentive problems, which emerge 
from the conflicting interests of lenders and borrowers and, under hidden 
information, may result in moral hazard, (iv) enforcement problems, which increase 
the costs for lenders, and (v) covariance problems, as the activities funded may be 
influenced by systemic shocks” [5].   
 
Given the State banks’ failure in credit provision, microfinance institutions have been 
considered as the new paradigm of rural finance and as a strong response to the 
difficulties of providing financial services (loan and deposit) to poor populations and 
especially smallholder farmers. The success of Asian and South American 
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believe that microfinance is a new paradigm capable of contributing in an efficient 
way to the provision of credit towards poor farmers and thus to the reduction of rural 
poverty.  This new lending technology resorts to non-traditional approaches to 
collateral requirements, such as the mechanism of supervision and collateral through 
village banking groups and allows a win-win institutional setting. The basic 
assumption of this new paradigm is that problems of information, which results in 
anti-selection problems, moral hazard, informational costs and barriers to access, are 
resolved, because the partners are well known given social and geographic proximity 
and social pressure.  
 
Despite the proliferation of microfinance organizations operating in Kinshasa, the 
results of this study show that many farmers and poor populations in the Hinterland of 
Kinshasa continue to face limited access to credit. The results from subjective as 
reported by the respondents of the survey suggest that high risks related to agricultural 
activities and low returns, weak portfolio of microfinance, as well as the methodology 
of credit (collateral, high interest rates, non compatible loan terms and procedure) 
applied in microfinance remain the main constraints to the financing of agriculture. 
These results suggest that microfinance institutions in the Hinterland of Kinshasa are 
far from correcting the imperfections of the agricultural credit market and from the 
objective of increasing access to micro credit for the benefit of the poorest of the poor, 
notably poor farmers. 
 
In the light of results from logit models, one could note that the characteristics related 
to household social capital endowment, to household human capital, to household 
financial capital and to household physical capital are the main determinants of credit 
constraints status. These characteristics provide information on household capacity to 
repay loan and coping strategy with high covariant risks. One could observe that the 
richest of the poor are less exposed to the risks of being credit constrained rather than 
the poor of the poorest. These findings confirm what has been reported in some 
previous empirical studies. These studies reported that the degree of poverty affects 
the response to credit, which is not intended for the poorest and most vulnerable [10, 
19, 20, 21].  
 
The results of impact evaluation  conform to what has been argued and evidenced in 
literature from developing nations [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25] and 
support the paradigm of a virtuous sequence “micro credit - pro-poor growth – 
poverty reduction”, inspired from the paradigm of “financial liberalization, growth 
and poverty reduction. In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that the 
provision of credit towards poor farm households would contribute to the reduction of 




This study investigates the effects of credit constraints on household’s economic 
welfare in the Hinterland of Kinshasa. Given the counterfactual problem related to the 
impact evaluation, the Propensity Score Matching was applied to compute the impact. 





Volume 12 No. 3  
May 2012 
economic organizations, regular household access to remittances, land holding, 
household access to extension services and household size are found to be significant 
determinants of household credit constraints. In terms of policy implications, these 
findings suggest that rural and agricultural development policy aiming to promote 
farm household participation in off-farm activities, to improve a better access to 
agricultural advocacy and extension services, to enhance farmer access to land 
holding and social and economic networks could reduce the risks of credit constraints 
and thus remove the majority of constraints related to the financing of farm activities. 
Furthermore, a better remittance policy would reduce household credit constraints and 
improve the chances of obtaining credit. The findings also show that credit 
constrained households are estimated to have lower welfare outcomes than 
unconstrained households. Thus, the improvement of farm household credit access 
would enhance welfare distribution. This is only possible if the outreach of 
microfinance is improved and the lending technologies are innovated to meet the 
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1.660(0.610 - 4.516) 0.317 




0.391(0.209 – 0.729) 0.000 





0.351(0.183 – 0.674) 0.001 




0.428(0.320 – 0.797) 0.007 




0.007(0.00 1- 0.005) 0.000 




0.002(0.008 – 0.009) 0.000 




0.880 (0.466 - 1.667) 0.697 




1.957 (0.967 - 0.958) 0.059 










Table 2: Households characteristics (continuous variables) 
 
Variables 
Rationed Non rationed Difference 
Means SD Means SD Value P.value 
SIZEH 5.201 1.732 4.327 1.994 0.873 0.002 
DRATIO 0.503 0.230 0.511 0.265 0.007 0.832 
EDUCHH 9.368 3.853 9.586 3.947 0.218 0.717 
HHAG 44.996 9.434 45.189 10.766 0.196 0.897 
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Table 3: Distribution of household welfare       
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Table 4: Table: Results from Logit Model of Credit Constraints  
 
Variables Coefficients. Std. Err. z P>z 
HHSIZE 0.413 0.189 2.18 0.029 
HHMAL -105.032 0.976 -1.08 0.282 
DRATIO 1.279 1.184 1.08 0.280 
HHAG -0.003 0.034 -0.09 0.928 
EDUCHH 0.081 0.080 1.02 0.308 
REMITTANCE -0.341 0.581 -0.59 0.557 
ASSOCIATION -1.466 0.672 -2.18 0.029 
OFFFARM -1.323 0.624 -2.12 0.034 
LANDPROPERTY -4.487 1.103 -4.07 0.000 
FARMSIZE 0.312 0.314 0.99 0.321 
EXTENSION -3.382 0.847 -3.99 0.000 
MBANKANA 0.659 0.699 0.94 0.346 
DUMI 1.274 0.807 1.58 0.114 
CONSTANT 494.103 2.351 2.10 0.036 
Number of observations 202    
LR chi2 154.01    
Prob> Chi2 0.000    
Pseudo R2 0.635    





Table 5: Distribution of Propensity Score of being Credit Constrained  
 
 
Percentiles Smallest   
1%     .0722119 .0722119   
5%     .0722119 .0722119   
10%     .1825988 .0722119 Obs 195 
25%     .4041671 .0722119 Sum of Wgt. 195 
50%     .9788712  Mean .7368888 
 Largest Std. Dev. .3436655 
75%     .9983873 .9998783   
90%     .9994375 .9998783 Variance .118106 
95%     .9997383 .999917 Skewness -.8369852 
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Per Capital total consumption per day Nearest 
neighbors 
- 259.877 171.983 - 1.511 
  Radius - 328.421*** 115.097 - 2.853 
  Kernel - 268.773** 126.859 - 2.119 
  Stratification - 279.533*** 111.339 - 2.511 
 Per Capita Non-Food Consumption per day Nearest 
neighbors 
- 63.503 63.44 - 0.985 
  Radius - 109.696* 66.44 - 1.643 
  Kernel - 61.252 63.498 - 0.965 
  Stratification - 64.38 70.721 - 0.91 
Per Capita Food Consumption per day Nearest 
neighbors 
- 197.373* 106.398 - 1.855 
  Radius - 218.725*** 69.947 - 3.127 
  Kernel - 207.521** 96.062 - 2.16 
  Stratification - 215.153** 90.183 - 2.386 
Ratio  Per capita Total Consumption per 
day  to poverty line 560 FC (1$) 
Nearest 
neighbors 
- 0.464 0.357 - 1.299 
  Radius - 0.586*** 0.185 - 3.17 
  Kernel - 0.48* 0.273 - 1.756 
  Stratification - 0.499*** 0.194 - 2.568 
Ratio Per Capita Total Consumption per day 
to poverty line 120 FC(2 $) 
Nearest 
neighbors 
- 0.232* 0.133 - 1.746 
  Radius - 0.293*** 0.109 - 2.688 
  Kernel - 0.24*** 0.11 - 2.187 
  Stratification - 0.25** 0.104 - 2.401 
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